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WHENTHECOURTHASAPARTY,HOW 
MANY "FRIENDS" SHOW UP? 
A NOTE ON THE STATISTICAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF AMICUS BRIEF FILINGS 
DANIEL A. FARBER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Amicus briefs have been a significant subject of empirical 
research. 1 Researchers have also used the number of amicus 
briefs filed in a case as a measure of the case's importance.2 
Lawyers also have reason to be interested in amicus briefs, 
which have gone from being exceptional to being the norm in 
Supreme Court cases.3 This study addresses some basic ques-
tions about amicus filings: what is the distribution of this meas-
ure of case importance? How does it relate to other measures of 
importance such as a case's citation rates? 
Because this study is an outgrowth of a previous one,4 it 
may be helpful to begin with a summary of the previous re-
Sho Sa to Professor of Law. University of California. Berkeley. 
1. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill. The Influence of Amiws 
Curiae Brief\· on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000); Lee Epstein, Interest 
Group Litigation During the Rehnqui.1t Court Era. 9 J. L. & Pol. 639 (1993); Donald R. 
Songer and Reginald S. Sheehan. Interest Group Success in the Courts: Amiws Participa-
tion in the Supreme Court, 46 POL. RES. Q. 339 (1993). 
2. THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT 
ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 62-63 (2006)(using amicus filings as a measure of political 
salience); FORREST MALTZMAN. JAMES F. SPRIGGS II. & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, 
CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000): Timothy R. 
Johnson, James F. Spriggs II. and Pual J. Wahlbeck. Passing and Strategic Voting on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 39 LAW. & SoC'Y. REV. 349. 363 (2005). 
3. Epstein. supra note 1, at 645 (graph showing that since the end of the Warren 
Court era, the proportion of cases with amicus briefs has roughly doubled). 
4. Daniel A. Farber. Earthquakes and Tremors in Statlllory Interpretation: An 
Empirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 848 (2005). 
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search. In that study, using citation data for the Supreme Court's 
1984 and 1990 Terms, I examined patterns of citation frequency 
in order to test three models: 
• Under the first model, the extent of an opinion's contri-
bution to the law (and thereby its influence) is deter-
mined by a host of independent factors. This model pro-
duces a bell-shaped distribution of "step lengths," ranging 
from baby to giant steps. The data did not support this 
model. 
• Under the second model, judges have bounded rational-
ity and strong attachments to existing rules, leading them 
to take "baby steps" most of the time but occasional "gi-
ant steps" when continued adherence to an existing norm 
proves untenable. In empirical studies by various social 
scientists, this kind of model has been found to produce 
frequency distributions that are roughly normal but have 
a characteristic known as "leptokurtosis." The data also 
failed to support this model: the degree of leptokurtosis 
was much too high, so that the curves were far from the 
normal distribution. 
• The third model stems from complexity theory (also 
known as chaos theory or fractal geometry.) This type of 
model applies to many dynamic processes-for example, 
it fits the frequency distribution of earthquakes. This 
model was supported by the data, explaining most of the 
variance in the data (with R2 over .80 for both of the 
Terms I studied) 5 
The current study tests these models (along with one additional 
one) in the context of amicus brief filings. 
During the earlier study I became intrigued by the apparent 
divergences between the number of times a case was cited in 
later court rulings versus other citations (primarily law reviews). 
A regression analysis6 showed that my impression was correct. 
Although an increase in the number of case citations did predict 
5. hi. at ~liS. ~li7. The findings were consistent with an earlier study. David G. Post 
and Michael B. Eisen. How Long is the Coastline of the Law~ Thoughts on the Fracwra/ 
Nawre of Legal Systems. 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545 (2000). 
li. For readers who are unfamiliar with regression analysis. the Russell Sage Foun-
dation has published several helpful handbooks for social science students in its series 
·'Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences." See MICHAEL LEWIS-BECK. APPLIED 
REGRESSIOt': A:--1 [:--ITRODUCTION (19~0): CHRISTOPHER ACHEN. INTERPRETING ASD 
USING REGRESSIOI' (19~2): LARRY SCHROEDER. DAVID SJODQUIST. & PAULA STEPHAN. 
U:--IDERSTAI'DING REGRESSION ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE (19~li). 
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a higher average number of noncase citations, almost none of 
the variance was explained (with an R 2 of only .07).7 When I di-
vided the ten most heavily cited cases into two groups, based on 
the proportion of judicial versus non-judicial citations, the dif-
ference between the groups was striking. Of the five cases most 
frequently cited by courts, all but one dealt with a procedural is-
sue, and the exception dealt with ERISA preemption.8 The five 
cases most frequently cited in law reviewers involved more so-
cially salient issues such as discrimination.9 In short, the courts 
seemed most keenly interested in procedure, while the commen-
tators were drawn to cases with quasi-constitutional overtones. 10 
The two primary results of the current study regarding the 
frequency distribution of amicus briefs are as follows. First, a 
power law distribution does provide improved fit (over linear 
regression), but less strikingly than for citation frequencies. An 
exponential distribution is a slightly better fit and might well be 
preferred. Both distributions leave significant unexplained vari-
ance. The broader implication is that the number of briefs filed 
in a case probably depends on a fairly complex set of frictions 
and feedback loops. It is plausible to assume that the same 
probably holds true of other types of efforts to influence gov-
ernment decisionmakers (i.e., lobbying). 
Second, amicus brief filings are unrelated to the number of 
federal appellate citations received by an opinion, but are mod-
7. Although weak, the positive relationship was genuine. The X coefficient was 
significant at the 2.5% level. 
H. The five cases were FMC Corp v. Holliday. 49H U.S. 52 (1990) (ERISA preemp-
tion): Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 49H U.S. 89 (1990) (statute of limitations in Title 
VII case against federal government); Grogan v. Garner, 49H U.S. 279(1991) (burden of 
proof in certain bankruptcy procedures) (the most highly cited statutory case of the 
Term!); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (habeas procedure); Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute. 499 U.S. 5H5 (1991) (whether a forum selection clause violated a 
maritime statute). 
9. The five cases were EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) 
(application of Title VII on foreign soil); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 
U.S. 20 (1991) (enforceability of agreement to arbitrate discrimination claim): Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (abortion counseling restriction); Feist Publications. Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (application of statutory and consti-
tutional requirements of originality in copyright case); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 
(1991) (implications of state sovereignty for interpretation of civil rights law). 
10. In this study, rather than using total judicial citations. I studied appellate cita-
tions, so the results are not directly comparable. In fact. it turns out that appellate cita-
tions have a greater correlation with law review citations, at least in this sample (R' = 
.49). It also appears that amicus brief filings are an indicator of how often the Supreme 
Court itself will later cite a decision. See JAMES H. FOWLER ET AL., NETWORK ANALYSIS 
AND THE LAW: MEASURING THE LEGAL IMPORTANCE OF SUPREME COURT 
PRECEDENTS 35 (2006) (on file with author). 
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estly related to the number of law review citations. We should be 
cautious about using any one of these measures as the sole gauge 
of an opinion's importance. There seem to be distinct dimen-
sions of case importance, an issue that deserves further investiga-
tion in its own right. 
I. POSSIBLE MODELS 
We do not have a systematic understanding of the process 
that leads to the filing of amicus briefs. 11 A 1993 study revealed 
several important factors. First, many amici are repeat players. 12 
Second, surveys of amici suggest that the most important factor 
is the perceived relevance of the case to the organization's goals, 
followed by the quality of the case as a legal vehicle. 13 Third, fil-
ing an amicus brief is costly - ranging from $8,000 to about 
$20,000. The average organization surveyed had an interest in 
about sixteen cases; for half the organizations, participating in 
that number of cases would have exceeded the organization's en-
tire litigation budget. 14 Fourth, economic interest groups filed an 
increasing share of the amicus briefs. 15 
We also know that individual organizations do not make fil-
ing decisions in a vacuum. State governments have formed a 
network that results in concerted filing activities: 
During the 1990 Term, for example, in cases in which at least 
one state filed a friend-of-the-court brief, the average number 
of other states participating was 15.7. In only three cases did a 
state participate as amicus curiae without the support of oth-
16 
ers. 
Or consider the following advice to lawyers with cases before the 
Supreme Court: "[i]n today's world, effective representation of 
11. This paper focuses on amicus briefs that are filed on the merits of the case. Fil· 
ing at the cert. stage seems to be less frequent but is strongly associated with the Court's 
likelihood of taking the case. See Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, Organized 
/meresls and Agenda Selling in /he U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 
(19gg). 
12. Epstein. supra note 3, at 660. Experienced lawyers tend to have more success 
before the Court. See Kevin T. McGuire, Repeal Players in the Supreme Court: The Role 
o( Experienced Lawyers in Litigalion Success, 57 J. POL. 187 (2001 ). Kearney and Merrill. 
supra note 1. at 749. report a similar finding for amicus briefs. 
13. Epstein. supra note 1. at 660. 
14. /d.at661. 
15. /d. at 680. 
Hi. Epstein. supra note 1. at 671. Note. however. that the "participation" of other 
states does not necessarily track the number of amicus briefs: they may simply join as 
additional amici on a brief rather than fihng their own. 
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your client requires that you at least seriously explore the possi-
bility of enlisting persuasive amicus support on your client's be-
half."17 
One obvious motive for filing an amicus brief is to influence 
the result in a case. It is unclear how effective briefs actually are 
in this regard, particularly if we exclude those filed by the Solici-
tor General on behalf of the United States. The authors of the 
most recent and thorough empirical study report that "amicus 
briefs supporting respondents enjoy higher success rates than do 
amicus briefs supporting petitioners; that small disparities of one 
or two briefs for one side with no briefs on the other side may 
translate into higher success rates but larger disparities do 
not .... " 18 Notably, the number of cases filed tends to be similar 
on both sides of the case. 19 A final relevant fact: the Court itself 
does not serve a gatekeeper function; it routinely approves filing 
of briefs in cases where the parties themselves fail to consent. 
In the absence of a strong theory for predicting filing, we 
may turn to more general models as a source of guidance. One 
possibility is that the number of amicus briefs filed in a given 
case is more or less random-that is, that it is the product of un-
related factors operating in different directions, which happen to 
balance out one way or another in a particular case. Trying to 
identify and measure these various factors would be difficult. 
But, it turns out, we may be able to identify this kind of random-
ness without specifying the causal links. A basic theorem of 
mathematical statistics links this form of randomness with the 
famous bell-shaped, normal distribution. More precisely, the 
central limit theorem states that "the sum of a large number of 
independent random variables will be approximately normally 
distributed almost regardless of their individual distributions; 
any random variable which can be regarded as the sum of a large 
number of small, independent contributions is thus likely to fol-
low the normal distribution approximately."20 
17. Bruce J. Ennis, Symposium on Supreme Cour/ Advocacy: Effective Amicu.1· 
Brief~. 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603 (1'184). Similarly, Judge Posner remarks that the "vast 
majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants and duplicate the arguments 
made in the litigants' briefs." Rayan v. Commodity Futures Trading Com'n, 125 F.3d 
1062. 1063 (7th Cir. 1 '!'!7). A 1 11'17 review requires disclosure of whether counsel for a 
party authored any part of an amicus brief and also requires disclosure of financial con-
tributions toward producing the brief. Kearney and Merrill. supra note 1. at 766. 
18. Kearney and Merrill. supra note 1, at 74'1. 
111. /d. at 822. The authors suggest that there may be a kind of arms race, in which 
amici file simply to counter filings on the other side. ld. at 821. 
20. M.G. BULMER. PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 109 (2d ed. 1967, 1979 corrected re-
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We could not expect an exact correspondence between cita-
tion data and the normal distribution, if only because the normal 
distribution requires an infinite domain in both directions while 
the number of citations to an opinion cannot be a negative num-
ber. In assessing deviations from normality, a few parameters are 
especially useful. For later reference, here is a list: 
Central The mean, the median, and the mode of a 
Tendency normal distribution ::tre the same. 
Skew 
Kurtosis 
A normal curve is symmetrical rather than 
being skewed in either direction. Symmetry 
is measured by the skew parameter, which is 
zero for the normal distribution. 
Kurtosis measures whether a curve is flat-
tened out or unusually peaked, compared 
with the normal distribution. Kurtosis for 
the normal distribution is sometimes given 
as 3. 21 However, my software used a differ-
ent formula, for which the normal distribu-
tion comes out at zero. 
Leptokurtosis in data has an important implication for deci-
sionmaking.22 Change data from human institutions have, in 
comparison to the Gaussian (normal) distribution, an excess of 
cases in the central peak, an excess of cases in the tails of the dis-
tribution, but a paucity of cases in the "shoulders," the area be-
tween the central peak and the tails. In terms of amicus briefs, 
the idea would be that most briefs get some average amount of 
attention from interested groups that results in filings, but there 
may be a tendency for attention to snowball once a case begins 
getting attention. The snowballing effect can lead to distribution 
tails that follow the third model (discussed below). 
Another variant of the second model leads to an exponen-
tial distribution. In this model, cognitive and institutional factors 
function only as a source of friction, essentially impeding the re-
action of decisionmakers to relevant information. 23 The hy-
print). For a sketch of one proof. see id. at 115-16. 
21. See id. at 61-65. 111. 
22. The literature is surveyed in Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner. A 
Model of Choice j(Jr Puhlic: Polic:y. 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 325 (2005). 
23. Bryan D. Jones, Frank R. Baumgartner, Christian Breunig et al.. Are Poliliwl 
2007] WHEN THE COURT HAS A PARTY 25 
pothesis is that the number of cases with N + 1 amicus briefs is a 
fixed fraction of the number of cases with N briefs. This results 
in a distribution having the form y = be"' . Apart from friction, 
this might also reflect a diffusion process. For example, there 
could be a core group whose members tend to be the first to de-
cide to file in a case, information leaks out from this group to a 
larger group whose members then must decide to file; if they do, 
the information then leaks out to another group. 
The third model entered the law review literature in an in-
novative study of judicial citations by David Post and Michael 
Eisen. 24 They speculated that law may have the same branching 
properties that generate certain fractal geometric objects, be-
cause each legal issue can potentiall~ sprout sub-issues, which in 
turn can sprout sub-sub-issues, etc. 5 Post and Eisen explained 
how such fractal branching is associated with power law distribu-
tions, in which frequency varies as some power n of a basic pa-
rameter. Such distributions are "produced at the boundary be-
tween order and disorder, at the 'edge of chaos."'26 Power law 
distributions are "well nigh ubiquitous in a wide variety of physi-
cal, biological, and social systems. "27 Post and Eisen cited exam-
ples involving meteorology, demographics, biodiversity, and 
medicine-as well as the example I have chosen as emblematic, 
earthquake sizes. 28 Based on a very large sample of New York 
Court of Appeals cases and another sample of Seventh Circuit 
decisions, they find a good fit with their hypothesized power law 
(especially for the New York data). 29 
Systems Poised between the "Order'" oF Friction and the "Chaos" of Urgency? Public 
Budgeting in Comparative Perspecth·e. http://www.policyagendas.org/pdf!BudgetsAre 
Paretian2.pdf (October 2006). 
24. Post and Eisen. supra note 5. 
25. !d. at 553-5'1. 
26. ld at 56S. 
27. !d. at 56'1. 
2S. !d. at 56'1 n.56'1. For other examples. see Pablo Marquet. Of Predator.\·, Prey, 
and Power Laws, 2'15 SCIENCE 2229 (2002) (referring to the "vast number of biological 
power laws"): Thomas Bak. Power-Law Distributions and the Federal Judiciary. 46 
JURISMETRICS 139 (Winter 2006) (number of court filings per district follow power law 
distributions). 
2'1. Post & Eisen supra note 5. at 571-S3. 
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II. DATA ANALYSIS 
I randomly chose a Term between the Rehnquist-era Term 
in my first study and Rehnquist's departure from the Court.30 
The term selected was the 1997 Term. In addition to Rehnquist, 
the Court consisted of Justices Stevens , O'Connor, Scalia, Tho-
mas, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter. Table 1 gives some 
statistics about the the individual Justices and their cases. 
Justice 
Stevens 
O'Connor 
Scalia 
Thomas 
Kennedy 
Ginsburg 
Breyer 
Souter 
Rehnquist 
Table 1 
Characteristics of Assigned Cases 
Average amicus Average total 
number briefs 
cites per per assigned case 
assigned case 
4 326 
7 365 
5 682 
7 219 
5 707 
3 184 
2 522 
4 661 
6 524 
These figures suggest some interesting patterns. The four 
most conservative Justices (Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Ken-
nedy) averaged 5.75 amicus briefs per assigned case, compared 
with 7.0 for Justice O'Connor (the Court's swing voter), and 3.25 
for the Court's remaining, more liberal Justices. This suggests 
the possibility that having a high number of amicus briefs is cor-
related with the tendency of the Chief Justice to assign cases to 
allies or swing voters he wishes to cultivate. 31 
30. The reason for considering only later Terms was simply to make the study more 
current. 
31. Conservatives also had somewhat more total cites per opinion (an average of 
533) than liberals (averaging 423). This supports the idea that citation counts do indeed 
relate to a case's significance. assuming that the Chief Justice assigns the most significant 
opinions to his allies. One could improve on this result by separating out those cases 
where the Chief was in the minority. so the assignment would be made by the senior Jus-
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Figure 1 
Amicus Brief Frequency 
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The situation becomes more interesting when we look at the 
overall distribution of amicus briefs, which is illustrated in Figure 
1. Figure 1 looks nothing like a normal distribution. As table 2 
demonstrates, this visual impression is correct: the distribution 
has significant leptokurtosis and skew. But the statistics are less 
useful in distinguishing between the remaining three models. 
The kurtosis and skew seem low enough to be consistent with 
the bounded rationality assumptions of model 2. Since model 2 
has been successfully used elsewhere to denote the attention 
given agenda items, it might well fit here. 
tice in the majority (probably Stevens in those cases). 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Amicus Briefs per Case 
Mean 4.758241758 
Standard Error 0.474332809 
Median 3 
Mode 1 
Standard Deviation 4.524846613 
Sample Variance 20.47423687 
Kurtosis 1.319868246 
Skewness 1.199535843 
Range 22 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 22 
Sum 433 
Count 91 
I then did a series of regressions to extract further informa-
tion from the data. I first ran a linear regression of the number of 
cases with a given number of amicus briefs against that number 
(i.e., frequency against number of briefs per case). The R2 was a 
respectable .51, meaning that about half the variance in the fre-
quency was explained. I then regressed the log of the frequency 
against the number of amicus briefs, improving the R2 to .71. 
This provided some support for the exponential model. Finally, I 
regressed the log of the number of briefs against the log of the 
frequency, with comparable results (a slightly lower R2 of .68). 
On the whole, this data for amicus briefs does not fit the 
power law model that seems to apply generally to citations. We 
can think of the exponential model and power law model as be-
ing in a sense sequential: first we take the log of one variable and 
see how much explanatory power we gain (the exponential 
model) and then we also take the log of the other variable (the 
power law variable ).32 Geometrically, we are squeezing the lin-
ear graph first along the y-axis and then along the x-axis. It turns 
32. I should mention a small technical problem: the cases that had zero briefs. The 
logarithm of zero is undefined. I tried two different ways of dealing with this problem. 
The first was to add one to the number of briefs and then take logs. It occurred to me 
that this could cause distortions, so I also tried doing the regression while excluding the 
cases that had no amicus briefs. The differences in results between the two approaches 
were not significant. 
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out that there's a substantial increase of explanatory power in 
the first stop (with R2 rising by .2) but then a slight loss with the 
second stop (with R 2 declining by .03). Thus, the distinctive geo-
metric feature of the power law seems irrelevant. 
The inappropriateness of the power law model is also sug-
gested by comparing the distribution of amicus briefs with the 
characteristics of the distribution of citations. Figure 2 shows the 
frequency distribution for "total citations" for the 1997 Term. 
>-(.) 
c: 
60 -
50 -'-
40 
Figure 2 
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This figure starts with a very high peak, drops off very quickly, 
but then has a very long right tail that drops off very slowly. As 
shown in Table 3 descriptive statistics for the total citations were 
also quite different from those for the amicus briefs, with much 
higher skew and kurtosis. 
Table 3 
Distribution of Total Citations Per Case 
Mean 469.307692 
Standard Error 72.8371973 
Median 235 
Mode 223 
Standard Deviation 694.822578 
Sample Variance 482778.415 
Kurtosis 8.92234187 
Skewness 2.95104786 
Range 3629 
Minimum 15 
Maximum 3644 
Sum 42707 
Count 91 
The upshot is that Model 2 (friction and diffusion) looks the 
strongest for amicus filings, although Model 3 cannot be defi-
nitely rejected. In the hope of getting a better grasp on the situa-
tion, I ran an additional series of regressions of the number of 
amicus briefs in a case versus various citation counts for that 
case. There's no reason to expect a linear relationship here, so 
instead of using the raw scores, I regressed the ranks of the 
numbers (that is, a case might be counted as being 30th in terms 
of number of amicus briefs, 20th in number of law review cites, 
etc.) 
The results were intriguing. Ranking in terms of appellate 
cites was essentially unrelated to ranking in terms of number of 
amicus briefs (R2 = .03, so almost none of the variance was ex-
plained, and the x coefficient was .2, meaning that moving up 
one rank produced an average increase of only .2 ranks.) 33 Thus, 
33. Given this result. it is no surprise that amicus brief rank was also weakly related 
to total cites. with an R' of .12 and an x coefficient of .39.) 
2007] WHEN THE COURT HAS A PARTY 31 
the number of amicus briefs filed in a case predicts very little 
about the case's total number of citations. 
The regressions using law review citations were more note-
worthy. When regressing law review citation rank against amicus 
rank, the R2 was .299 (meaning almost a third of the variance 
was explained) and the x coefficient was .6 (meaning that mov-
ing up one rank in the amicus brief ranking caused an average 
move of .6 up in the law review citation ranking). As a check, I 
decided to go ahead and do a linear regression of the absolute 
numbers (number of amicus filings in a case versus number of 
law review cites for the case. The R2 sank to .16 (so the relation-
ship apparently is not very linear after all). Nevertheless, the x 
coefficient was 16.3, significant at well below the .001 level, 
meaning that adding one amicus brief results in roughly sixteen 
additional law review cites. 
My prior study suggested that law review citations were of-
ten connected with measures of societal relevance, as opposed to 
the more procedural issues that tend to provoke attention the 
most often from appellate courts. The relationship between 
amicus filings and law review citations provides some supporting 
evidence. It also suggests, however, that amicus filings also in-
volve important factors that are unrelated to the factors which 
legal academics find significant about a judicial decision. 
III. INTERPRETING THE DATA 
Beyond the statistical data, an examination of some individ-
ual cases may help round out the picture. Table 4 lists the six 
cases with the highest number of amicus briefs, along with their 
other characteristics. 
32 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:19 
Table 4 
Cases with the Most Amicus Briefs 
W-1 z r/)r/) ~(/) > 
u 0 w..~W-1 :JLJ... ~W-1 W-IVJ .....lr/) 
1= 1= VJ2 UW-1 ~t- ~L.Ll ~W-1 :< oi ~;:;: ou ~t t-t-r/) o-:J ,.... ti:t) ~u t-U -. :::3 ~co .....l 
Stare Oil Co. v. 
O'Connor 522 U.S. 3 Khan 13 236 313 549 
Arkansas £due. 
Television 
523 u.s. Com'n v. 
Kennedy 666 Forhes 15 132 316 448 
Cass Cormry, 
Minn. v. Leec;h 
Lake Band of 
524 U.S Chippewa 
Thomas .103 Indians 15 15 43 58 
523 u.s. Unired Srales v. 
Ginsbur~ 360 U.S. Shoe Corp. 13 26 38 64 
Phillips v. 
Washing11!1l 
524 U.S. Legal 
Rehnquist 156 Foundation 22 81 221 302 
522 U.S. General £lee. 
Rehnquist 136 Co. v. Joiner 14 979 612 1591 
Briefly, here is what the cases were about and a description 
of the amici: 
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation34 was a challenge 
to state financing for legal aid. The specific claim is that the di-
version of interest from lawyers' client accounts to finance the 
program was a taking.35 The Court upheld the claim but there 
was a remand to determine the amount of compensation, if any. 
The amici were public interest groups (conservative and liberal), 
state governments, and representatives of the bench and bar. 
Notably, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief. 
Arkansas Educ. Television Com'n v. Forbes36 was a First 
Amendment case, in which a third-party candidate complained 
that a public T.V. station had excluded him from a candidates' 
34. 524 U.S. 156 (1998). 
JS. An additional wrinkle is that under federal law. neither the lawyers nor the cli-
ents could themselves earn interest on accounts of this type. To my mind, this makes the 
takings claim far-fetched. but a majority of the Justices obviously took a different view. 
36 523 U.S. n66 (1998). 
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debate it was broadcasting. He lost. Some amici were public in-
terests groups like the ACLU; most were government organiza-
tions (including the FCC) or broadcasters. 
Cass County, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indi-
ans37 involved the claimed immunity of certain Indian reserva-
tion lands from state taxation. Nearly all the amici were, not sur-
prisingly, either Indian tribes or state and local governments. 
United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp. 38 involved the constitution-
ality of a harbor maintenance tax under the Export-Import 
Clause, as obscure a constitutional issue as one can imagine. 
Nearly all the amici were from shipping interests. The tax was 
struck down. 
State Oil Co. v. Khan 39 was a notable antitrust case. Overrul-
ing precedent, the Court held that a maximum price term in a 
franchise contract was not per se illegal. The United States filed 
on one side; thirty-three states filed on the other. There were 
other non-aligned filers, and a few briefs were filed by franchisee 
representatives. The large majority of the briefs, however, were 
filed by firms or trade associations on the franchisor side of the 
case. 
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner40 involved the trial judge's power 
to exclude "unreliable" expert testimony, a matter of great im-
portance to the torts bar. Amici included trial lawers' associa-
tions, the United States, representatives of the medical profes-
sion like the AMA, and a few public interest groups, but many 
represented industry interests. The Chamber of Commerce and 
National Association of Manufacturers filed, as well as trade as-
sociations and members of the pharmaceutical and chemical in-
dustries. In line with the observation in my previous paper, this 
procedural case was the only one to receive a large number of 
citations by courts. 
Perhaps the most obvious finding is that amicus filings tend 
to come in clumps. There is the "relevant industry" clump, the 
"public interest" clump, and the governmental clump. In part, 
this may simply be a matter of whose interests are affected - the 
universe of interests affected directly by Supreme Court opin-
ions may be quite lumpy. It may also represent, however, the 
operation of networks among certain groups or their lawyers, 
37. 524 u.s. 103 (1998). 
38. 523 u.s. 360 (1998). 
39. 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
40. 522 u.s. 136 (1997). 
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which could either operate through a concerted effort or merely 
by diffusing information. Whatever its cause, this clumping ap-
parently does not have any relationship to how often cases are 
cited by lower courts. The three cases that got significant law re-
view attention were on subjects commonly encountered by law 
students and relatively popular with law reviews: constitutional 
law, evidence, and antitrust. 41 
For comparison purposes, I then took a look at the cases in 
which only one amicus brief had been filed. The amici in those 
cases included the ACLU, the United States (twice), the Com-
missioner of Social Security, one state and one group of twenty-
two states, the National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers (four times), a foundation devoted to sentencing reform, 
and the car manufacturer's trade association (once). In strong 
contrast to the top five cases, where industry filings were fre-
quent and tended to come in clusters, industry took little interest 
in these cases. 
Whether an entity files an amicus brief depends on atten-
tion (do organizational decisionmakers take notice of a case?) 
and interests (does the benefit of filing outweigh the cost?). The 
two are interrelated, since organizations presumably are more 
likely to pay attention to cases that affect their interests strongly. 
There also seem to be a somewhat limited universe of potential 
filers, consisting of major business entities and associations, legal 
organizations, governments (particularly the United States); and 
public interest associations. The interests of other groups - such 
as criminal defendants and crime victims, consumers, taxpayers, 
non-unionized workers, and the general public- are represented 
only to the extent that one of these large organizations chooses 
to do so. Many of these organizations have overlapping interests, 
so attention may be an important factor in determining which 
ones participate. 
One might expect that there might be a damping effect, that 
is, that if an entity is aware that other briefs will be filed, there is 
less marginal benefit from adding its own brief. This does not 
seem evident from the data. For example, the presence of other 
briefs from of chemical and pharmaceutical companies in Joiner 
did not seem to deter additional filings, although it seems doubt-
ful that the additional briefs added anything of great substance. 
41. The average number of law review cites for all 1997 Term cases was 150.6. 
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The exponential fit (suggestive of friction or diffusion 
mechanisms) was slightly better than the power law fit (sugges-
tive of positive feedback). Both fit the data fairly well, though 
not as well as the power law typically fits citation data. It is pos-
sible that some combination of the two might be more success-
ful, with friction dominating below a certain threshold and then 
positive feedback taking over. 
It is not difficult to imagine friction or diffusion mecha-
nisms. The individuals who have final authority in an organiza-
tion over the decision to file may have bounded rationality, using 
one or two factors to make the decision. Over time, these factors 
change as experience builds up about their suitability, and at any 
given time, decisionmakers in different organizations may be at 
different stages of this process. 
Organizational issues may also present barriers to filing; the 
default choice is not to file and competition for scarce funds may 
make it difficult to get authorization. Outside of the universe of 
frequent Supreme Court players, information about the impor-
tance of the case may spread with difficulty, affecting the likeli-
hood that non-frequent filers will enter the game. We might 
learn more about these mechanism with a statistical study focus-
ing on filers rather than cases. In other words, it would be very 
useful to investigate how many organizations file a specific num-
ber of briefs. The study would probably have to continue over 
more than one Term to get a sense of the distribution at the left 
end of the distribution, 
Feedback mechanisms between organizations are also easy 
to imagine. Filings by other organizations (either allies or oppo-
nents) may make a case more salient for decisionmakers. The at-
tendant publicity might also attract attention from entities that 
do not normally follow the Court closely, such as organizational 
members, who may wonder why their organization has failed to 
take part in a case when so many others have done so. Filings on 
one side may lead to more opposing filings in order to avoid an 
imbalance, which in turn prompt responsive filings on the first 
side. On the other hand, filings by allies (especially in cases that 
do not have high salience) may reduce the likelihood that an or-
ganization will file, since the case is already "covered." 
As noted at the beginning of this paper, some researchers 
have used amicus filings as a measure of the importance of an 
opinion. The amount of feedback, negative and positive, in the 
filing decision at least introduces a great deal of noise in this 
measure. Moreover, it is far from clear, even apart from the 
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noise, what the number of briefs tells us about the importance of 
a case. Perhaps it should not be too surprising that the number 
of briefs is unrelated to the number of judicial citations of a Su-
preme Court opinion. The cases that have the most citations are 
those that are relevant in later litigation involving large numbers 
of litigants; collective action problems may prevent such large 
groups from mobilizing. The relationship between amicus briefs 
and law review citations is stronger but still modest; at least the 
two measures seem to point in the same direction. Since these 
measures are (to say the least) not highly correlated, we should 
think twice before relying on any single statistic as a measure of 
case importance. 
For those who are interested more broadly in governmental 
processes, the results should also be interesting. Filing an amicus 
brief is an effort to influence a government decisionmaker; 
hence, a form of lobbying. Admittedly, it differs from other lob-
bying in its formality and more importantly, in the inability to of-
fer the decisionmaker any benefits in return for support. Never-
theless, the results do suggest that the intensity of lobbying on 
any specific issue is not a simple function of the underlying 
alignment of interests, but also involves an interplay of cognitive, 
institutional, and information factors. In this regard, it would be 
interesting to know how the number of organizations that pro-
vide congressional testimony is distributed across bills (pre-
sumably adjusting for the size of the legislation itself). 
To return to the question posed in the title: when the Su-
preme Court has a party (in the form of an argued case), how 
many "friends" come to the event? The best we can say at this 
point is that the answer depends on the case and may involve a 
number of frictional forces as well as feedback effects. 
2007] WHEN THE COURT HAS A PARTY 37 
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Clinton v. City of 
524 us 417 New York 7 108 471 579 
524 U.S. 184 Bryan v. U.S. 2 139 84 223 
Crawford-£! v. 
523 U.S. 574 Britton 4 682 144 826 
U.S. v. Estate of 
523 U.S. 517 Romani 0 34 58 92 
523 u.s. 420 Miller v. Albright 1 66 203 269 
Quality King 
Distributors, Inc. 
v. L'anza 
Research Intern., 
523 U.S. 135 Inc. 10 29 142 171 
522 U.S. 252 RC?.Kers v. U.S. 0 9 7 16 
522 u.s. 118 Kalina v. Fletcher 6 375 60 435 
Monge v. 
524 U.S. 721 Cali]()rnia 7 104 112 216 
Eastern Enters. v. 
524 u.s. 498 A~! 13 196 361 557 
42. Signed Opinions for the 1997 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court were identified 
using a terms and connectors search of U.S. Supreme Court Cases which was restricted 
by date (10/1997-71199H) and restricted by field (Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, etc.) 
43. Amicus briefs were tabulated using information in a list of documents that ap-
pears at the end of each case in Westlaw. The number of amicus briefs for each entry was 
tabulated by counting the number of westlaw documents in which "amicus" or "amici" 
appeared in the description. 
44. Federal Appellate Court Citations were tabulated using the "cites" tab in Lex-
isNexis. Tabulation includes U.S. Supreme Court, 1st-11th Circuits, Federal Circuit, Fed-
eral Circuit Court of Appeals, and D.C. Circuit. 
45. Law Review Citations were tabulated by using the "Unrestricted Shepard's 
Summary" in LexisNexis. 
46. Total was tabulated by taking the sum of Federal Appellate Court Citations and 
Law Review Citations. 
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Nat'! Endowment 
for the Arts v. 
524 U.S. 569 Finley 11 113 382 495 
Gebster v. Lago 
Vista Ind. Sch. 
524 U.S. 274 Dist. 7 256 357 613 
California v. Deep 
523 U.S. 491 Sea Research, Inc. 9 49 101 150 
Cohen v. de la 
523 U.S. 213 Cruz 1 285 60 345 
South Dakota v. 
Yankton Sioux 
522 U.S. 329 Tribe 10 49 97 146 
Lunding v. New 
York Tax Appeals 
522 u.s. 287 Tribunal 0 7 43 50 
City of Chicago v. 
International 
College of Sur-
522 U.S. 156 Reons 3 458 72 530 
State Oil Co. v. 
522 U.S. 3 Khan 13 236 313 549 
Pennsylvania 
Dept. of Correc-
524 U.S. 206 tions v. Yeskey 12 314 204 518 
American Tel. 
and Tel. Co. v. 
Central Office 
524 U.S. 214 Telephone, Inc. 2 144 48 192 
Textron Lycom-
ing Reciprocating 
Engine Div., 
A vco Corp. v. 
United Auto. 
Aerospace, Agri. 
Implement Work-
ers of America, 
523 u.s. 653 Intern. Union, 0 76 15 91 
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Atlantic Mut. Ins. 
523 U.S. 382 Co. v. C.I.R. 2 23 24 47 
523 U.S. 296 Texas v. U.S. 2 178 15 193 
Oncale v. Sun-
downer Offshore 
523 U.S. 75 Svcs, Inc. 8 1526 797 2323 
Steel Co. v. Citi-
zens for a Better 
523 U.S. 83 Environ. 12 1614 409 2023 
523 u.s. 1 Spencer v. Kemna 1 895 71 966 
522 U.S. 398 Brogan v. U.S. 1 68 143 211 
Allentown Mack 
Sales and Svc., 
522 u.s. 359 Inc. v. NLRB 6 168 91 259 
Burlington Indus-
tries, Inc. v. 
524 U.S. 742 Ellerth 8 2520 862 3382 
Bragdon v. Ab-
524 U.S. 624 batt 1 763 676 1439 
524 U.S. 308 Caron v. U.S. 0 90 27 117 
524 U.S. 236 Hahn v. U.S. 4 113 82 195 
Kiowa Tribe of 
Oklahoma v. 
523 U.S. 751 Manuf Tech., Inc. 11 103 132 235 
Arkansas Educ. 
Television Com 'n 
523 U.S. 666 v. Forbes 15 132 316 448 
Calderon v. 
523 U.S. 538 Thompson 3 369 110 479 
Campbell v. Lou-
523 U.S. 392 is ian a 1 57 72 129 
Oubre v. Entergy 
522 U.S. 422 Operations, Inc. 5 127 65 192 
522 U.S. 52 Salinas v. U.S. 1 327 129 456 
Faragher v. City 
524 U.S. 775 of Boca Raton 8 2808 836 3644 
524 U.S. 666 U.S. v. Balsys 1 42 157 199 
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Geissal v. Moore 
524 U.S. 74 Medical Corp. 3 24 16 40 
United States v. 
524 U.S. 51 Bestfoods 4 278 197 475 
County of Sacra-
523 u.s. 833 menta v. Lewis 10 1540 400 1940 
New Jersey v. 
523 u.s. 767 New York 3 17 36 53 
Beach v. Ocwen 
523 U.S. 410 Federal Bank 3 65 20 85 
Lexecon Inc. v. 
Milberg Weiss 
Bershad Hynes & 
523 u.s. 26 Lerach 8 149 122 271 
Fidelity Financial 
522 U.S. 211 Svcs., Inc. v. Fink 1 43 21 64 
522 U.S. 67 Foster v. Love 0 9 37 46 
524 U.S. 321 U.S. v Bajakajian 1 235 228 463 
Pennsylvania Bd. 
Of Probation and 
524 u.s. 357 Parole v. Scott 8 58 106 164 
524 U.S. 88 Hopkins v. Reeves 4 58 37 95 
Cass County, 
Minn. v. Leech 
Lake Band of 
524 u.s .103 Chippewa Indians 15 15 43 58 
Dooley v. Korean 
Air Lines Co., 
524 u.s. 116 Ltd. 1 20 41 61 
523 u.s. 303 U.S. v. Scheffer 6 290 165 455 
Feltner v. Colum-
bia Pictures Tete-
523 u.s. 340 vision, Inc. 5 107 102 209 
Bogan v. Scott-
523 U.S. 44 Harris 4 242 56 298 
Nat'! Credit Un-
ion Admin. V. 
First Nat'! Bank 
522 u.s. 479 & Trust Co. 7 124 112 236 
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Alaska v. Native 
Village of Venetie 
522 U.S. 520 Tribal Govt. 12 24 129 153 
United States v. 
524 U.S. 1 Cabrales 1 72 27 99 
Air Line Pilos 
523 U.S. 866 Ass'n v. Miller 3 43 32 75 
Montana v. Crow 
523 U.S. 696 Tribe of Indians 5 2 13 15 
United States v. 
523 U.S. 360 U.S. Shoe Corp. 13 26 38 64 
Kawaauhau v. 
523 U.S. 57 Gei_g_er 1 657 64 721 
Regions Hasp. v. 
522 U.S. 448 Shalalala 0 83 24 107 
Rivet v. Regions 
Bank of Louisi-
522 U.S. 470 ana 0 388 55 443 
Baker by Thomas 
v. General Motors 
522 U.S. 222 Corp. 6 105 184 289 
Bay Area Laun-
dry & Dry Clean-
ing Pension Trust 
Fund v. Ferbar 
522 U.S. 192 Corp. of Cal. Inc. 8 53 9 62 
Jefferson v. City 
522 U.S. 75 of Tarrant, Ala. 0 14 17 31 
522 U.S. 23 Bates v. U.S. 1 75 48 123 
Wisconsin Dept. 
of Corrections v. 
524 U.S .381 Schacht 1 363 75 438 
524 U.S. 266 Forney v. Apfel 1 44 6 50 
524 u.s. 125 Muscarello v. U.S. 1 344 130 474 
Federal Election 
524 U.S. 11 Com 'n v. Akins 5 145 158 303 
Ohio Forestry 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Si-
523 u.s. 726 erra Club 5 243 134 377 
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523 u.s. 511 Edwards v. U.S. 1 208 52 260 
Almendarez-
523 u.s. 224 Torres v. U.S. 1 2497 332 2829 
523 u.s. 155 Lewis v. U.S. 1 30 30 60 
523 u.s. 185 Gray v. Maryland 4 196 61 257 
522 u.s. 87 Trest v. Cain 2 140 34 174 
Swidler & Berlin 
524 u.s .399 v. u.s. 6 116 257 373 
Phillips v. Wash-
ington Legal 
524 U.S. 156 Foundation 22 81 221 302 
United States v. 
524 U.S. 38 Beg[5!rll'_ 0 131 28 159 
Calderon v. Ash-
523 U.S. 740 mus 2 164 51 215 
523 u.s. 614 Sousley v. U.S. 3 1898 118 2016 
Stewart v. Marti-
523 U.S. 637 nez-Villareal 8 304 78 382 
Ohio Adult Pa-
role Authority v. 
523 u.s. 272 Woodard 6 103 120 223 
United States v. 
523 u.s. 65 Ramirez 3 117 57 174 
LaChance v. 
522 U.S. 262 Erickson 1 43 37 80 
Buchanan v. An-
522 U.S. 269 Ketone 2 160 110 270 
General Elec. Co. 
522 u.s. 136 v. Joiner 14 979 612 1591 
522 U.S. 93 Hudson v. U.S. 3 227 278 u 
Total was tabulated by taking the sum of Federal Appellate Court Ci-
tations and Law Review Citations. 
